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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to assess the demand for public schooling in the Brazilian
municipalities within a median voter framework. The quantile regression and spatial
techniques proved to be useful to account for the spatial and marginal eﬀects associated
with educational services. The coeﬃcients attached to the main variables – price, income
and population – were signiﬁcant and had the expected sign. The relatively high values
for those parameters attest the status for these merit goods as “luxuries”. Last, but no
least, the municipal school system in Brazil seems to present increasing returns to scale
both, at the school and the municipality level.
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Resumo
O objetivo deste estudo é estimar a demanda por serviços educacionais nos municípios
brasileiros dentro de uma abordagem do eleitor mediano. Técnicas de regressão quantílica
e de econometria espacial provaram ser úteis para captar efeitos espaciais diferenciados
e de transbordamento na demanda municipal por educação. Os coeﬁcientes estimados
das principais variáveis – preço, renda e população – foram signiﬁcantes e apresentaram
os sinais esperados. Os valores relativamente altos desses parâmetros atestam esses bens
meritórios como ‘de luxo’. Por ﬁm, nossos resultados sugerem que o sistema educacional
no Brasil apresenta retornos de escala tanto em nível da escola quanto do município.
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1. Introduction
Education policies represent a decisive contribution to a nation’s progress as it
fosters productivity and reduces poverty. Recent studies have consistently found
that additional years or levels of schooling are translated into a large labor
market premium. Also, there is by now a growing consensus that education is
a critical determinant of income distribution. Indeed, current research point outs
to education as the single most important determinant of inequality. 1 This point
is particularly relevant for Brazil, a country characterized by extreme inequalities,
and a correspondingly social debt, that seriously jeopardize the long run growth
prospects of the economy. Hence, the urge to improve public education oﬀered
at earlier stages and to promote a wider access to secondary education is crucial
to Brazil as it may help to reduce the strong political demands for redistributive
measures and contributes to a sustainable and equitable growth.
To achieve these goals Brazilian governments at diﬀerent levels devote a
considerable amount of resources to fund public schooling. Local government
eﬀorts as well as a substantial share of their revenues – augmented by state
and federal grants – are allocated to increase the much required educational
standards, making schooling expenses one of the largest items of municipal budgets.
In order to reduce regional educational disparities and increase teachers’ wages,
earmarked transfers such as FUNDEF (Fund for Maintenance and Development of
the Fundamental Education and Valorization of Teaching), injected a considerable
amount of resources into the basic educational system. In this context, the analysis
of local public expenditures with education in Brazil is highly pertinent.
School expenditures may be analyzed from a number of perspectives. Among
them we ﬁnd studies which emphasize the role played by demand on the provision
of public education. Following the seminal work of Bergstrom et al. (1982),
many empirical studies used survey data to estimate the demand for educational
expenditures (Rubinfeld et al. 1987; Rubinfeld and Shapiro 1989; Shapiro and
Papadakis 1993). An alternative way of modeling education demand is the
well known median voter model (Lovell 1978; Inman 1978; Holcombe 1980). If
preferences are single-peaked, this model predicts that voting by majority rule over
a single-dimensional public good will result in the provision of the median voter’s
desired level of public schooling.
The median voter as a model of demand aggregation under majority rule has
proven to be quite robust as attested by many empirical studies (Holcombe 1989).
Besides the knowledge of demand functions, this hypothesis takes into account the
existence of economies of scale and congestion in the provision of school services and
permits to identify the eﬀects of changes in demographic and economic variables
on the amount of the educational services demanded. Here, we will adhere to this
tradition to investigate the determinants of local education expenditures on basic
1 See Barros (1992).
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education in Brazilian municipalities.
Although many studies have used the median voter approach, only a few
incorporated inter-jurisdictional spillovers into the median voter’s demand function
for public goods (Murdoch et al. 1993). This point is especially meaningful when
we are dealing with municipalities. The existence of multiple interactions among
neighbor towns makes decisions in a given commune dependent on the ones adopted
by the other communes in a close area. The relevance and direction of such
interactions are an empirical matter that should be investigated. One might think,
for example, that in close areas, schools in a given commune may be a substitute for
the ones located in its neighborhood, thus, reﬂecting a free riding behavior by the
median voter. Alternatively, a higher demand for education in one community may
increase the demand for this service in neighbor’s towns. This complementarity may
be explained by competition among municipalities or by the fact that education in
nearby communes is a joint product and thus enhance each other’s value through
a better neighborhood quality. To account for that dependence here we will use
spatial models along the lines proposed by Anselin (1988).
Moreover, most of the previous studies on local educational expenditures used
classical linear regression to estimate models for conditional mean function.
However, when municipalities are highly heterogeneous, as is the case in Brazil,
results produced by the classical model may be misleading because they fail to
account for this diversity. Quantile regression methods, that oﬀer a mechanism
to estimate models for the conditional median and other conditional quantile
functions, are more appropriate to grasp diﬀerences among communes. This
approach could be useful when estimating the median voter model for schooling
because it allows the impacts of the conditioning variables to diﬀer across the
expenditures distribution and permits to examine the marginal eﬀects of the
exogenous variables across educational spending levels.
The objective of this paper is to assess the demand for public schooling in the
Brazilian municipalities within a median voter framework. Our model diﬀers from
previous work in the speciﬁcation of the spatial structure and the use of quantile
regression techniques to account for the above mentioned spatial and marginal
eﬀects associated with the demand for educational services.
This paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model for
demand for schooling based in the median voter framework. Section 3 describes the
data and variables. Section 4 describes the econometric model. Section 5 presents
the results. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions.
2. Demand for Schooling within a Median Voter Model
Let i = 1,...,M denote municipalities. The median voter preferences are
represented by a quasi-concave utility function on private goods (Ci) and publicly
provided education (e):
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u = u(Ci,e) (1)
Due to the presence of congestion in consumption, the quality of the public service
depends on the size of the community’s population (N). Using the proportional
metric proposed by Bocherding and Deacon (1972), the congestion function may
be written as:
E = Nγe (2)
Where E is the total education and γ measures the crowding eﬀect. If γ is one,
the public good is private and there is no beneﬁt from scale economies for the
community: the individual consumption is equal to 1/N. On the other hand, if γ is
zero, the good is a purely public good. Notice that if γ is higher than one the good
is marginally over congested (Reiter and Weichenrieder 1999). Every additional
user requires an increase in the supply of E so as to keep e constant. Values of
γ between 0 and 1 allow for the possibility of goods that have partly private and
partly public characteristics, where crowding eﬀects are presents but there are still
economies of scale in consumption.
The median voter maximizes its utility function subject to its budget constraint:
Yi = Ci + tbi (3)
The price of the private good (C) has been normalized to be equal to 1. All
individuals within the jurisdiction consume the same level of education, herein
denoted by e, whose price is p. The income of the median voter is given by Yi; bi
represents its tax base and t is the municipality tax rate. The individual’s demand
functions depend also on the government’s budget constraint, given by:
cEi = Gi + tBi (4)
where c is the constant marginal and average cost of production of public service; 2
Bi stands for the tax base, tBi corresponds to total tax revenues and G represents
the intergovernmental grants received by the i-th municipality. Rearranging (4) for
t and using it together with (2) in the median voter’s budget constraint gives:
Yai = Yi + g(bi/b) = Ci + (bi/b)cNγ−1e (5)
Yai corresponds to the revenue of the median voter increased by its share of
per capita intergovernmental grants, g = G/N, and b = B/N., where B stands
for the total tax base. The median voter’s income plus its share of the per capita
intergovernmental transfer must ﬁnance its private expenses as well as its cost share
on education (bm/b)cN
γ−1
i e. Rewriting (5) we have
2 Bergstrom and Goodman (1973, p. 280) showed that this will be possible even if communities
produce public goods using some local inputs whose prices may diﬀer from place to place, so long
as all municipalities have identical, homothetic production functions and face horizontal supply curves
for inputs.
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Replacing (6) in (1) yields the following maximization problem:
maxu = u
￿￿





Assuming that the maximization of [7] yields the median voter’s demand function
for education, e, we have:
e = e[Ya,(bi/b),N] (8)
Deﬁning the tax price of schooling as the individual cost of purchase one
additional monetary unit of education it can be derived by diﬀerentiating Ya with
respect to e. The tax price is therefore:
∂Ya/∂e = p = (bi/b)cNγ−1 (9)
Each consumer knows his own tax price and is able to determinate the amount
of commodity 3 which his choose for the community. Supposing that the demand
function deﬁned by (8) is characterized by constant price and income elasticity, it
can be written as:
e = αpβ1Y β2
a (10)
Using [9], rearranging the terms, and writing [10] in terms of E, by means of [2]
we have:
E = eNγ = αcβ1(bi/b)β1Y β2
a N[(γ−1)β1+γ] (11)
Finally, adding a vector Ω of socio-economic characteristics, which are expected
to inﬂuence demand, and multiplying (11) by p leads to an estimable function of
local educational expenditures, ˇ E:




Rewriting (12) in log terms, yields the standard estimation equation for analyzing
the demand for locally supplied public goods:




where k = αc1+β1 and (1 + β1) is the price elasticity of the demand for public
schooling. The population elasticity, β3, satisﬁes the following equation:
1 + β1 + β3 = γ(2 + β1) (14)
3 Reiter and Weichenrieder (1997, p. 21) showed three reasons why electors may misperceive the costs
of public services: “ﬁscal illusion”; “ﬂypaper eﬀect” and “revenue-complexity”.
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3. Data and Variables
The data used in this study were obtained from the Census 2000 and
the Base de Informações Municipais (BIM) of IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de
Geograﬁa e Estatística – Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics). To
complement the required information we used data from the Instituto de Pesquisa
Econômica Aplicada (IPEA – Institute for Applied Economic Research), Ministry
of Education, particularly those referring to the FUNDEF (Fundo de Manutenção
e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e de Valorização do Magistério – Fund
for Maintenance and Development of the Fundamental Education and Valorization
of Teaching) as well as two others municipal database: the one built by the
Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional (STN – National Treasure Secretariat) and the
Base de Finanças Municipais do Brasil (FINBRA). The sample consists of 3,426
municipalities, out of a total of 5,507 Brazilian municipalities. The communes for
whom some information was missing were excluded of the data set. Data on local
tax revenues was obtained from STN. Table 1 provides the complete list of variables.
4. Spatial Estimators
As previously stated, since the cross-sections in this study are municipalities,
spatial dependence may occur due to the existence of interactions among neighbor
towns. To consider these interactions we will use the spatial autoregressive model
(Anselin 1988) and the Conley correction for spatial dependence (Conley 1999).
Below we will brieﬂy describe those models.
4.1. The Anselin model
Let n be the number of observations, y = (y1,...,yn)′ the vector of dependent
variable, X a matrix of dimension n × p, containing the explaining variables, β
a p-dimensional vector of unknown parameters and u an n-dimensional vector of
random errors.
y = ρWy + Xβ + u; u = λWu + ε; with ε ∼ N(0,σ2 ln) (15)
where W is an n×n matrix that controls for the existence of neighborhood eﬀects.
Here, a spatially explicit variable takes the form of a “spatial lag” or spatially lagged
dependent variable, which consists of a weighted average of the neighboring values.
This model is also known as the Spatial Autoregressive Model.
The interpretation of the parameter ρ is straightforward: for our application, if
diﬀerent from zero, the value for ρ gives the extent to which education expenditures,
for a given municipality, are inﬂuenced by the expenses of its neighbors. The
sign of this eﬀect, as previously stated, depends on the relationship between
expenses among communes. If they act as complement, we should expect a positive;
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Table 1
Dependent and explanatory variables: a brief description
Dependent variable Description
Municipal Spending on Education – E The value of municipal spending with education
Explanatory Variables Description
Tax share – bm/b The tax share of the citizen with the median income,
based on the ratio between the median and the average
income.
Median Income – ym Median earnings, median income plus tax share × per
capita intergovernmental grants.
Total Population – N Number of citizens in a municipality (total population).
% Population > 15 years old literate Demographic variable. Population above 15 years old
that is illiterate.
% Population < 15 years old Demographic variable. Population below15 years old.
% Population > 60 years old Citizens older than 60 in percent of total population.
Demographic Density Population/area of the community (scale variable).
Urbanization rate Ration between the urban population and total
population.
Enrollment Education scale variable. Data refers to primary and
secondary enrollment in municipal schools.
Enrollment per school Education scale variable. Data refers to primary and
secondary enrollment in municipal schools.
Enrollment in private schools Education variable. Data refers to enrollment in
municipal private schools.




Participation in Inter-Municipal Consortia Proxy to administrative coordination and organization
among municipalities.
Council power Power yielded to municipal councils. Proxy to
eﬀectiveness in resource utilization.
Alvorada program Special development program that includes
municipalities whose IHD (Index of Human
Development) is inferior to 0.5. Municipalities
participating in this program take 1; zero otherwise.
North, Northeast, Southeast and Center-West Regions Proxies to evaluate for regional and geographic
inﬂuence. Municipalities located in these regions take
1; zero otherwise
Colligation 1 Colligation formed by the political parties that support
the Federal government. When the mayor belongs to
this colligation, it takes 1; zero otherwise.
Colligation 2 Colligation formed by the political parties that oppose
the Federal government. When the mayor belongs to
this colligation, it takes 1; zero otherwise.
otherwise, a negative relationship indicates substitution among spending levels. The
parameter λ captures the spatial correlation between the errors and ε is a new error
term.
The contiguity matrix W plays a key role in spatial modeling by quantifying
the notion of location similarity. This matrix, crucial to test statistics, may be
deﬁned in a number of ways. For instance it may assume a binary form, based on
shared borders. Then, the element (i,j) from W is one if municipalities i and j are
neighbors and zero otherwise, neighborhood being deﬁned as geographical distance
that does not exceed a certain distance. Alternative ways to this binary form for
the W matrix includes deﬁning weights as an inverse function of distance or even
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general “social” distance. 4
The spatial simultaneity shown by (15) violates OLS assumptions. Hence, this
method will yield inconsistent and biased estimates making its inference ﬂawed.
Consequently, estimation methods that account for this simultaneity should be
used such as maximum likelihood (ML) principle and instrumental variable (IV)
estimation in a spatial two-stage, least-squares approach (Anselin 1988). However,
these spatial techniques are highly sensitive to the speciﬁcation of the neighborhood
matrix (W). Below we will present an alternative way to correct for spatial
dependence.
4.2. The Conley correction
Conley (1999) used nonparametric methods to build up a consistent estimator
for the GMM (Generalized Methods of Moments) moment conditions covariance
matrix, corrected for spatial dependence. His approach is a variant of the well known
Newey and West (1987) estimator for the spatial dependence covariance matrix in
presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. As the GMM estimator does not
assume a parametric form, it is robust to model speciﬁcation, distance measurement
errors and missing values. Inferences from this model are therefore robust to more
general spatial error structures.
Notice that in absence of endogeneity problems, the Conley estimator coincide
with the one produced by the OLS method; therefore, its use do not alter the
estimated values for the β parameters, modifying only the statistical inference
referent to these estimations.
5. Results
Firstly, we will present OLS and GMM spatial results. Table 2 shows estimates
for the β parameters as well as the standard error and the p-values, for both OLS
and spatial GMM. The cut oﬀ criteria adopted here for the GMM correction is
0.5 that corresponds to an inﬂuence area of roughly 50 kilometers. Remember that
the GMM estimator does not make any assumption about the parametric form
of the spatial dependence and does not interfere with the estimation of the OLS
parameter. However, although the point parameter estimates for OLS and spatial
GMM coincide, the standard errors can be diﬀerent, implying diﬀerent hypothesis
test results because the latter corrects the covariance matrix for spatial correlation.
Our results show that, for most coeﬃcients, the OLS procedure underestimated
the standard errors; consequently, the distributions of the p-values appear more
concentrated in the region close to zero. However, most variables, in spite of higher
standard errors, remain signiﬁcant at the 1% and 5% level. The exception is the
4 For technical details, see Anselin (1988).
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variable urbanization that looses its signiﬁcance when we account for the spatial
dependence. Below, we discuss these results in detail.
Table 2
Estimated demand for education expenditures in Brazilian municipalities – GMM Spatial
Results – 2000
Independent variables Dependent variable: municipality educational expenditures
Coeﬃcients OLS Spatial GMM ( cutoﬀ =0,5)
Standard-error p-value Standard-error p-value
Intercept -1,8666 0,2288 0 0,2864 0
Tax price -0,7486 0,0319 0 0,04 0
Median income 1,1914 0,0227 0 0,0286 0
Population 0,9318 0,0105 0 0,0152 0
Urbanization rate 0,0543 0,0138 0,0001 0,0289 0,0599
Demographic density -0,0296 0,0051 0 0,006 0
% Households earning up to 1minimum wage 0,0602 0,0087 0 0,012 0
Program Alvorada 0,0624 0,0184 0,0007 0,0198 0,0016
% Population < 15 years old 0,0782 0,0158 0 0,0214 0,0003
% Population > 60 years old -0,0654 0,0151 0 0,0183 0,0003
% Population > 15 years old literate -0,429 0,0668 0 0,0718 0
Enrollment in private schools -0,0381 0,0067 0 0,0079 0
Enrollment -0,9631 0,007 0 0,0066 0
Pupil per school -0,2074 0,0581 0,0004 0,0666 0,0018
Municipal Consortia -0,0294 0,0107 0,0058 0,0128 0,0212
Council power -0,0154 0,009 0,0862 0,0092 0,0919
Colligation 1 -0,0274 0,0145 0,0586 0,0132 0,0373
Colligation 2 -0,0421 0,0168 0,0122 0,0182 0,0206
North -0,2294 0,0296 0 0,0416 0
Northeast 0,1207 0,0242 0 0,0309 0,0001
Southeast -0,0665 0,0228 0,0036 0,0242 0,0061
Center-west 0,2095 0,0129 0 0,0161 0
Number of observations: 3426; Number of covariates: 22; Number of instruments: 22;
Horizontal cutoﬀ value: 0.5; Vertical cutoﬀ value: 0.5; J-statistics: 3.2893e-019;
J-statistics p-value: 1.
Concerning the core variables of the median voter model – price, income and
population – the computed demand elasticities are, respectively, -0.7486, 1.1914
and 0.9318. 5 These relatively high values – even when we control for neighborhood
characteristics and socio-demographic variables – should not be attributed to
aggregation problems 6 but to the underlying preferences of the community. The
estimated income elasticity higher than one conﬁrm previous results for the
median voter’s theory and attest the status of merit goods such as education,
as “luxuries” (Newhouse 1987; Gerdtham 1992; Falch and Rattso 1997). As for the
price coeﬃcients, although its value is higher than the ones found in the literature,
our ﬁndings conﬁrm previous results showing that educational expenditures are
5 Price-elasticities computed by Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1989) range from -0.43 to -0.719 whereas the
income elasticities found by those authors are between 0.695 and 0.931.
6 See ?.
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rather inelastic, (Rubinfeld and Shapiro 1989; Ahlin and Johansson 2001). The
estimated coeﬃcient for population reﬂects the economies of scale that characterizes
the provision of educational services in Brazilian municipalities.
As expected, a younger population (a higher share of people below 15 years old)
contributes to increase the demand for educational services; on the other hand, a
larger share of elder citizens leads to lower municipal education expenses suggesting
the existence of a potential competition between the elderly and younger segments
of the population for public resources (Poterba 1997; Ladd and Murray 2001).
Elderly people may prefer to spend on other public services such as health care
that beneﬁt them more directly. Also, they demand less education because they do
not have children at schools. Lastly, as elderly people tend to be better oﬀ than
the younger, even when they are head of family (phenomenon quite widespread in
the poorest Brazilian communes) their relatives can aﬀord to use private schools.
Corroborating previous studies, our estimates suggest that private schools are
substitutes for municipal public schools. A higher enrollment in private schools
reduces the demand for public schooling.
To account for the scale of operation in schools, we include two variables: total
enrollment and pupils per schools. Both variables were relevant for explaining
educational expenditures. Due to scale eﬀects, municipal education expenditures
grow slower than enrollment. The negative coeﬃcient for the variable pupils per
school support the existence of scale economies in teacher salary costs, supply costs,
and total educational costs. 7 Consequently, larger schools are cheaper because the
ﬁxed costs are diluted among a higher number of students.
Turning now to the municipality size, our results show that cities with very
high-density rates spend less on education, even when we control for population
and other relevant variables. This is likely due to the presence of local increasing
returns to scale prevalent among small municipalities. They fail to optimally use
their resources, because the scattered populations on those cities raise the average
costs of educational services, thus preventing them from exploiting the economies
of scale that characterizes the production of those services. Hence, the municipal
school system in Brazil seems to present increasing returns to scale both, at the
school and the municipality level. Finally, when we account for spatial eﬀects, the
positive eﬀect of the urbanization rate on educational expenses, found by using the
OLS model, is no longer signiﬁcant.
Let us now turn to impact of the socioeconomic characteristics of the communes
on their educational spending pattern. Poverty incidence, measured here by the
share of population whose household head earns up to one minimum wage, raises
educational expenses as the poor have no private substitute for public schools. This
positive eﬀect may also reﬂect the fact that the poor do not pay property taxes
and hence do not share the costs of ﬁnancing schools. Furthermore, among the very
poor municipalities, those taking part in the Alvorada Program tend to spend more.
This is probably due to the additional resources brought about by this program,
7 See Hanushek (1986), Sampaio de Souza and Stosic (2005).
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designed to improve the socio economic conditions of these poor areas. Finally, a
higher percentage of literates in a municipality leads to a reduced demand for local
public schooling.
The inverse relationship between educational expenses and participation in
inter-municipal consortia may be due to the fact that, ceteris paribus, the
coordination among neighbor municipalities to provide educational services
contributes to optimize the scale of operations and cut costs. One would also expect
that the more power yielded to municipal councils, the better the eﬀectiveness in
resource utilization and hence, the lower the expenditures required for a given
service because these councils would increase the transparency of the budgeting
process and contribute to more eﬀective control of corruption and misuse of local
funds. However, we only found weak evidence in both OLS and GMM models for
that hypothesis.
As for the political variables, municipalities where the mayor opposes the central
government (colligation 2) have smaller expenses than the ones where the mayor
stands for the ruling parties in Brasília (colligation 1). This also means that the so
called left parties that represent the main opposition, do not have a particularly
higher demand for public education – at least, their demand are not high enough
to counterbalance their more restrict access to public funds.
We also found that municipalities located in the Northeast region tend to spend
more on education when compared with the South region (the omitted region);
this result is reinforced by the positive coeﬃcient attached to the municipalities
participating to the Alvorada Program, where most of the cities are located in this
region. The same apply for the Center West region. Such a result is consistent
with the idea that, for diﬀerent reasons, both regions have, indeed, a greater
demand for public educational services. In the poor Northeast, public schools are,
frequently, the only ones available for many families as they cannot aﬀord its private
substitutes. In the relatively rich Center West, the highest expenses per student
may reﬂect the presence of the Brazilian Capital, which has one of the best and
expensive schooling systems in Brazil.
Finally, regarding the crowding out eﬀect, its computed value is 0.9455, below
the values found by previous studies (Reiter and Weichenrieder 1997), where
this parameter tends to be higher than one, thus implying a strong congestion
eﬀect. This result is hardly surprising. This comparatively large public ness of
government-supplied goods may be explained by the small size of the typical
Brazilian municipalities. We should expect a lower congestion eﬀect in presence
of signiﬁcant economies of scale that makes most of the municipality’s facilities
oversized, as is the case, for example, with the relatively small Brazilian schools.
Indeed, an increase in the number of students would lower the tax price of the
publicly provided schools as their cost is shared by a larger group. Of course the
value of this parameter depends on the deﬁnition of the tax rate. However, even
when we use a diﬀerent deﬁnition, our estimates were kept below the unity.
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5.1. Quantile regression estimates
To complement the econometric analysis carried out in the previous sub-section,
we proceed to a more detailed investigation using quantile regression methods, as
introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978). Just as classical linear regression allows
one to estimate models for conditional mean functions, quantile regression methods
oﬀer a mechanism for estimating models for the conditional median function, and
also for other conditional quantile functions. The OLS estimate considers only
the eﬀect of one variable in the medium point of the conditional distribution of
another dependent variable. Quantile regression permits to analyze the impact
of explanatory variables on diﬀerent points of the conditional distribution of the
dependent variable. The basic idea is to estimate the τ-th quantile of eﬃciency
conditional on the diﬀerent explanatory variables, assuming that this quantile may
be expressed as a linear predictor based on these variables. 8
We thus re-estimate the OLS models by using the techniques of quantile
regression. In order to do that, we considered the following conditional quantiles:
0.10 (percentile 10%), 0.25 (lower quartile), 0.50 (median), 0.75 (upper quartile)
e 0.90 (percentile 90%), that is (τ= 0.10; 0.25; 0.50; 0.75; 0.90). We used the
estimation method “BR”, proposed by Barrodale-Roberts, adequate for the case
where the sample size has around 3,500 observations and the only one that allows
for the “rank test”. The errors were considered not i.i.d, thus allowing for the
presence of heteroskedasticity. Notice also that this method satisfy the criterion of
“goodness-of-ﬁt” (the “pseudo-R2”) for model selection (see Koenker and Machado
1999).
To explicitly consider the spatial dependency, the Anselin Model, presented in
Section 4, was used. The contiguity matrix, W, used here considers that the element
(i,j) from W will be equal to the distance between municipalities i and j divided
by the maximum distance encountered; hence, we have a measure between zero
and one for all pairs of localities and not only a binary measure of neighborhood.
We turn now to the analysis of quantile estimations. Results shown in Table 3
qualify those previously obtained with the OLS and GMM models, as new and
useful information is added by using quantile regression. Firstly, the spatial eﬀects
become much evident. The estimates for ρ (coeﬃcients on spillover (equation (15))
are positive indicating that, for the median voter, neighborhood schools function
as complements to the ones located in their own municipality. Moreover, this eﬀect
decreases across quantiles. However, for the big cities, located on the last quantile,
this eﬀect is insigniﬁcant and changes its sign providing a weak evidence of the
existence of free riding behavior involving metropolitan areas that should be better
investigated.
The impact of the tax price increases along the expenditure classes. The higher
price elasticities for public education in cities with higher expenses are probably
8 For further details on the method see Koenker and Bassett (1978); Koenker and Basset (1982),
Koenker and Machado (1999).
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due to the fact that these cities have a large tax base and support a larger share
of their school system. So, they are more sensitive to its costs. Small cities, relying
basically on grants from the central government to fund their educational system,
are less sensitive to modiﬁcations in their tax price. Quantilic results reinforces the
fact that education is a normal (luxury) good, i.e. income elasticities increases with
income showing that higher levels of development bring about increased pressures
for education. Also, the well to-do voters concentrated in those areas are more
likely to vote for more public ﬁnancial support for schools, even if they send their
children to private school, because they place a greater priority on education.
As for population, except for the lowest quantile, the elasticity is fairly stable
across quantiles. The reduced coeﬃcient for the lowest quantile suggests that
the positive impact of population on expenditures, for small cities, is negligible.
Consistent with this result, the coeﬃcient attached to the demographic density
variable decreases along expenditure classes. This is rather expected as the
economies of scale in Brazil aﬀect mostly the small cities, unable to wipe oﬀ the
high ﬁxed costs of educational services. Once cities reach a certain level of size, the
agglomeration beneﬁts begin to peter out, while diseconomies rise rapidly.
Table 4 shows that the computed congestion parameter is reduced along total
spending classes showing that the degree of public ness for educational services is
higher for cities in the higher classes of expenses. This is apparently contradictory
as we expect big cities to be more congested when compared to small ones. Yet, a
careful look shows the drawbacks of such interpretation. Indeed, here we have two
distinct eﬀects acting simultaneously.
Firstly, in Brazil, institutional rigidities – such as the set up of maximum number
of students per class, far below the required by cost eﬃciency standards – prevent
even large cities to exploit the economies of scale that are present in educational
services. Secondly, larger cities oﬀer a more diversiﬁed range of educational services
– such as the extended journey at schools as well as sports and arts programs –
that are unavailable in small towns and contributes to increase spending along
the lines of the so called “zoo-eﬀect” pointed out by Oates (1988). So, in Brazil,
contrary to the traditional results, the reduced congestion eﬀect along the spending
classes reﬂects the predominance of the scale elements measured by the population
elasticities over the price eﬀects. Hence, the higher expenditures of larger towns
show not only a crowding cost but also the fact that these cities oﬀer a wide range
of services when compared to the small ones.
The positive eﬀect of the urbanization rate on educational expenses is signiﬁcant
only for the lowest quantile, a rather surprising result, as one would expect that the
higher costs brought about by urbanization would be more expressive for the largest
cities. Increased educational costs resulting from poverty incidence diminishes
across the quantile classes As previously mentioned, the poor inhabitants of small
towns have no private substitute for public schools and/or do not pay property
taxes. Also, the analysis of the socio economic characteristics points out to the fact
that for the smallest – and, probably, poorest – municipalities, the participation in
the Alvorada Program does not guarantee additional funds for education.
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Table 3
Determinants of the demand for educational services in Brazilian municipalities – Quantile
regression results – 2000
Explaining variables Dependent variable: municipality educational expenditures
τ = 0, 10 τ = 0, 25 τ = 0, 50 τ = 0, 75 τ = 0, 90
Intercept -2.2028*** -2.2681*** -1.9343*** -1.9276*** -1.5016***
(0.3883) (0.2468) (0.2496) (0.2509) (0.2645)
Spillovers(W.education
expenditure)
0.0179*** 0.0129*** 0.0081* 0.0081** -0.0008
(0.0060) (0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0046)
Tax price -0.6150*** -0.7411*** -0.7806*** -0.8175*** -0.8579***
(0.0492) (0.0310) (0.0331) (0.0333) (0.0346)
Median income 1.1291*** 1.1921*** 1.1876*** 1.2054*** 1.2333***
(0.0356) (0.0238) (0.0223) (0.0228) (0.0270)
Population 0.9110*** 0.9372*** 0.9312*** 0.9395*** 0.9302***
(0.0152) (0.0099) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0099)
Urbanization rate 0.0287** 0.0242** 0.0125 -0.0064 -0.0043
(0.0145) (0.0108) (0.0141) (0.0162) (0.0121)
Demographic density -0.0499*** -0.0383*** -0.0315*** -0.0306*** -0.0240***
(0.0090) (0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0054) (0.0065)
0.1022*** 0.0792*** 0.0613*** 0.0509*** 0.0534***
% Households earning up to
1minimum wage
(0.0133) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0092)
Program Alvorada 0.0101 0.0564*** 0.0757*** 0.0954*** 0.0637***
(0.0238) (0.0163) (0.0193) (0.0190) (0.0159)
% Population < 15 years old 0.0359 0.0656*** 0.0609*** 0.0671*** 0.1369***
(0.0231) (0.0153) (0.0164) (0.0160) (0.0183)
-0.0132 -0.0532*** -0.0524*** -0.0647*** -0.1210***
% Population > 60 years old (0.0240) (0.0147) (0.0158) (0.0154) (0.0180)
% Population > 15 years old
literate
-0.4735*** -0.3246*** -0.3045*** -0.3087*** -0.2500***
(0.0879) (0.0566) (0.0662) (0.0581) (0.0500)
Enrollment in private
schools
-0.0293*** -0.0418*** -0.0353*** -0.0381*** -0.0360***
(0.0092) (0.0062) (0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0050)
Enrollment -0.9724*** -0.9678*** -0.9655*** -0.9749*** -0.9613***
(0.0113) (0.0063) (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0084)
Pupils by schools -0.0044 -0.1479*** -0.1784*** -0.1019* -0.1808***
(0.0872) (0.0545) (0.0569) (0.0585) (0.0675)
Colligation 1 -0.0452* -0.0266** -0.0204* -0.0176 -0.0337***
(0.0258) (0.0126) (0.0123) (0.0133) (0.0091)
Colligation 2 -0.0670** -0.0377** -0.0255* -0.0138 0.0013
(0.0290) (0.0155) (0.0147) (0.0176) (0.0117)
-0.0234 -0.0303*** -0.0381*** -0.0289*** -0.0298**
Municipal Consortia (0.0157) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0120)
-0.0024 -0.0016 -0.0156* -0.0189** -0.0228**
Council power (0.0136) (0.0083) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0101)
North -0.2150*** -0.2198*** -0.2003*** -0.1881*** -0.1232***
(0.0383) (0.0293) (0.0334) (0.0433) (0.0405)
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Table 3
Determinants of the demand for educational services in Brazilian municipalities
Quantile regression results – 2000 – cont.
Explaining variables Dependent variable: municipality educational expenditures
τ = 0, 10 τ = 0, 25 τ = 0, 50 τ = 0, 75 τ = 0, 90
Northeast 0.1108*** 0.1657*** 0.1730*** 0.1406*** 0.1509***
(0.0343) (0.0219) (0.0254) (0.0242) (0.0234)
Southeast -0.0936*** -0.0306 -0.0153 -0.0404* -0.0765**
(0.0347) (0.0267) (0.0266) (0.0222) (0.0338)
Center-West 0.2431*** 0.2411*** 0.2430*** 0.1924*** 0.1951***
(0.0187) (0.0136) (0.0128) (0.0137) (0.0170)
Obs: a) in brackets: standard errors; b) *** – signiﬁcant in 1%; ** – signiﬁcant in 5%; * – signiﬁcant in 10%.
Elaborated by the authors.
Table 4
Congestion parameter across quantiles
Expenditure classes
Quantiles 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Congestion parameter 0,9357 0,9501 0,9436 0,9488 0,9389
Source: Authors’ results.
Concerning the school-related variables, the reduced coeﬃcient for enrollment in
private schools, for the lowest quantile, ﬁt in with the absence of private schools in
the small cities that predominates in this quantile. As for enrollment, the coeﬃcient
is quite stable across quantiles and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent only for the two superior
quantile. Cost reduction, induced by a higher number of pupils per school, is the
highest in the last quantile, where the big cities – and their larger schools – are to
be found. Notice that for the lowest quantile, the coeﬃcient, although negative, is
not signiﬁcant reﬂecting the existence small and dispersed schools situated in this
quantile.
Except for the ﬁrst class of spending, the participation in inter-municipal
consortia contributes to reduce school expenditures. This result is hardly surprising
as the smallest cities, concentrated in the lowest quantile, usually lack the
administrative organization required to implementing these consortia. Hence, they
are unable to exploit the gains from joining such associations. From the eﬃciency
aspect, this is a quite important result as it builds up a much-required coordination
among municipal administrations. On the other hand, the smaller coeﬃcients for
the highest quantiles show that the largest cities’ overcrowded schools have no need
to join consortia to reach the scale required to minimize costs. Lastly, empowered
municipal councils enhance the eﬃcient use of resources by reducing expenditure
only for the highest quantile, a rather expected result as those councils, frequently,
are not set up in very small cities.
Results involving the political variables are quite changed when disaggregated
into quantile classes. Now, for the larger municipalities situated in the last quantile,
the fact that their mayor belongs to the opposition is no longer a liability as
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suggested by previous results. This is consistent with the fact that those cities have
alternative channels to ﬁnance their school system. Accordingly, supporting the
national majority (colligation 1) does not prevent the municipalities from having
lower expenses when compared to the ones outside these two coalitions.
Concerning the location variables, the quantile results qualify the aggregated
ones. Thus, even if municipal expenses are higher for the Northeast and Center-East
regions, their spending behavior across expenditure classes is quite distinct for these
regions: in the latter, expenses are higher for the lowest quantile suggesting that
scale eﬀects predominate over the so called “zoo eﬀect”. Northeast towns present
an opposite result: spending is lower for the municipalities situated on the lowest
quantile, reﬂecting probably the less diversiﬁed educational services oﬀered by these
small cities.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we estimated the demand for education expenditures for the
Brazilian municipalities within a median voter’s framework. Results obtained are
consistent with the theoretical background thus suggesting that this hypothesis
might be useful to describe the demand for public schooling in Brazil. The use
of quantile regression and spatial techniques to investigate the spillovers and the
marginal eﬀects of the exogenous variables in the various spending levels proved to
be very useful in qualifying these eﬀects as the OLS results, in some cases, could
be quite misleading.
Conﬁrming previous studies we found out that the coeﬃcients attached to the
main variables in this model – price, income and population – were signiﬁcant and
had the expected sign. The relatively high values for those parameters suggest non
essential characteristic for educational services and attest the status of such merit
goods as “luxuries”.
Our results also suggest that the impact of the city size on the quality of club
goods shows crowding eﬀects as γ is between zero and one. However, in quantilic
model, marginal congestion slightly decreases with expenditure. This is rather
surprising as one is tempted to conclude that the congestion eﬀect should be higher
on big cities. Yet, a more careful look shows the drawbacks of such interpretation.
The indivisibilities that preclude the provision of certain services in small towns,
concentrate their provision on larger cities. Hence, the higher expenditures of those
big cities reﬂect not only a crowding cost but also the fact that these towns oﬀer
a wide range of services when compared to the small ones. This is consistent with
our ﬁndings showing that the municipal school system in Brazil seems to present
increasing returns to scale both, at the school and the municipality level.
Last, but not least, our analysis suggests that, in the future, we may expect
a reduced pressure for educational spending in Brazil. Indeed, as shown by the
analysis of the demographic variables, the aging of the Brazilian population will
reduce the demand for schooling. Moreover, the fact that the municipal school
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system in Brazil presents increasing returns to scale both, at the school and the
municipality level, demonstrates that it is possible to expand schooling, without
an equivalent increase in costs, just by exploiting the economies of scale that
characterizes the production of these services.
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